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I. Introduction
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973
based on findings that economic growth and development
unaccompanied by concern for the environment had rendered species
of fish, wildlife, and plants extinct.' Through the ESA, Congress
sought to protect those species that had already been seriously
endangered and to restore them to viability. The ESA "represent[s]
the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation. Its stated purposes
[are] 'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved,' and to 'provide a program for the conservation of
such.., species .... "2
To accomplish the goals of the ESA, the Secretaries of
Interior and Commerce were delegated the power to adopt specific
regulations to implement the Act The Secretaries are empowered to
compile a list of threatened or endangered species,4 and the Secretary
of the Interior may adopt regulations for the protection of listed
species.5 An endangered species is defined as "any species which is
in danger of extinction."6 A threatened species is any "likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future."7 The
ESA prohibits commerce in or the taking of any listed endangered
species.
The ESA is the culmination of a long history of increasing
federal participation in wildlife management and preservation.9 The
I See 16 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a)(1) (West 1996).
2 T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (quoting 16 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(b)).
3 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533.
4 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(c)(1).
5 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(d).
6 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6).
7 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(20).
S See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538.
See DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE To ITS
PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 19 (1989).
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ESA is remarkable because it elevates the conservation of listed
species above virtually all considerations, including economic ones.10
However, the efficiency of the ESA is limited by biological, political,
and fiscal realities. It would be practically impossible to address the
needs of the thousands of species that meet the listing standards."
The cost of recovering just one endangered species is tremendous. To
revive a majority of the listed species would cost millions of dollars
more than Congress can ever be expected to allocate.
2
The ESA is also limited in that it does nothing to protect
wildlife which is not listed as "endangered" or "threatened". Funding
and political constraints keep many species worthy of those terms
from ever realizing listed status. There is a tremendous backlog of
candidate species. The list of candidates includes approximately
4,000 species; it would take approximately 60 years for the Secretary
to make final determinations as to all of them.'3 The process of listing
a species begins when the species is proposed by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS). 4 The FWS gathers data from scientific
sources in order to determine whether the species warrants protection.
For most candidates, the process ends here. In 1993 there was not
enough information to make a decision about 3000 of 3600
10 See id at 25.
it See Reed F. Noss, From Endangered Species to Biodiversity, in
BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 228 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed., 1991).
12 See J. Michael Scott et al., Gap Analysis of Species Richness and
Vegetation Cover: An Integrated Biodiversity Conservation Strategy, in
BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 282,283 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed.,
1991).
13 See ROHLF, supra note 9, at 43.
14 An agency of the Department of the Interior which oversees the
recovery of all terrestrial and freshwater species of plants and animals; Andrew
Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species
Preservation, LAND ECONOMICS, Feb. 1, 1996, at p. 17, available in
WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS Database.
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candidates. 5
The listing process is also hindered by Congress, which
enacted appropriation riders prohibiting the listing of new species or
the designation of critical habitat during fiscal year 1995. The
moratorium continued during the budget battles between Congress
and President Clinton in 1996.16 The appropriations rider temporarily
ends the funding of the ESA and the Secretary is relieved of his duty
to make final determinations on species' listings "until a reasonable
time after appropriated funds are made available."' 7  Meanwhile,
environmental activists mourn as "fading species are forced to queue
up for recognition: the lynx, the black-tailed prairie dog, the Atlantic
salmon, the bull trout, the fisher, the red-legged frog. Many could
easily 'wink out' before ever being listed."' 8
Although many legislators give lip service to the Endangered
Species Act, their commitment to its principles often ends when
conservation efforts affect industry in their state or district.
Congressional representatives often argue successfully to lessen the
rigors of the application of the ESA to their pet projects. 9 Political
pressures may also result in the postponement of listing a species
is See id at 13-14; When the Secretary makes a determination that a
species or critical habitat should be listed, he formulates a regulation. Notice
and the text of the proposed regulation must be published in the Federal
Register. The Secretary must give actual notice to appropriate groups and
individuals and hold a hearing on the proposed listing if requested to do so. The
Secretary must use the best scientific and commercial data available in making
the listing decision. ROHLF, supra note 9, at 42-43.
16 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1203
(2
"d ed. 1996).
17 Id. (citing Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867 ( 9 'h
Cir., 1995)).
Is Paul Rauber, An End to Evolution: The Extinction Lobby in Congress
is Now Deciding Which Species Will Live and Which Will Die, SIERRA, Jan. 11,
1996, at 28.
19 See Michael J. Bean, Looking Back Over the First Fifteen Years, in
BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 37,39-40 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed.,
1991).
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until after the completion of a federal project, effectively rendering
it extinct.2' In fact, since the TVA v. Hill case in 1978 there have been
virtually no conflicts between endangered species needs and
development desires.2 '
The ESA alone is not enough to protect biodiversity in the
United States. The ESA expresses a national goal to protect and
sustain endangered species. This note proposes that the protection of
all native wildlife can be furthered by private parties utilizing the
state common law of public nuisance. A public nuisance action may
be used to enjoin agricultural or commercial land use which
unreasonably interferes with a state's wildlife or its habitat. The
advantage of such an approach is that animals or habitat may be
protected regardless of their ESA status. This may provide an
alternative or a supplement to the Herculean efforts required to get a
species listed. The hurdles to a private plaintiff bringing a successful
action in public nuisance are standing and a showing of sufficient
injury. However, these may prove to be less formidable than the
obstacles involved in the listing procedure.22
This note begins by setting forth a brief description of the
increasing awareness of the need to protect biodiversity and the
failings of the ESA in this area. Part III examines the elements of a
public nuisance action. Specifically, Part III reviews the
circumstances under which a healthy population of wildlife has been
recognized as a common good in which the public has a right.
Further, Part III analyzes when an interference with wildlife might be
deemed unreasonable. Part IV studies the standing requirements for
a private party to bring a public nuisance action. Finally, Part V
20 See idat 41. For example, in 1987 the Fish and Wildlife Service
neglected to list four endemic Tombigbee River freshwater mussels until after
the completion of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Id.
21 See id. at 41-42.
22 The determination of whether public nuisance law applies in this
context is also important in considering whether the application of the ESA to
private property may constitute a taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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considers the question of preemption of state common law public
nuisance by the ESA and other environmental statutes.
II. The Need for Protection of Biodiversity
Ecosystems are pyramidal in structure, with numerous plants
at the base and relatively few carnivores at the top. Energy flows
along food webs from plant to herbivore to carnivore, with many
interconnections. A reduction of species diversity within this system
will increasingly undermine its stability. However, an ecosystem
may be able to withstand the loss of several species with no
noticeable disruption while the loss of a keystone species23 may affect
all others. In many cases, the identity of such a keystone species and
the dynamics of the ecosystem cannot be accurately foreseen.24
Functioning ecosystems are important because they maintain
atmospheric quality; control and ameliorate climate; generate and
preserve soil; dispose of waste; and control pests and disease.25
There can be devastating effects within an ecosystem from seemingly
minor causes, such as the elimination of a few insect or plant species,
as illustrated by the following chain of events:
Malaria once infected nine out of ten people on the
island of North Borneo, now a state of Indonesia. In
1955, the World Health Organization (WHO) began
spraying dieldrin (a pesticide similar to DDT) to kill
malaria-carrying mosquitoes. The program was very
successful, almost eliminating this dreaded disease.
But other things happened. The dieldrin killed other
insects besides mosquitoes, including flies and
23 A keystone species is a species that plays a pivotal role in an
ecosystem; the diversity of the ecosystem depends upon it. See Noss, supra
note 11, at 233.
24 See ROHLF, supra note 9, at 16.
25 See id. at 15-16
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cockroaches inhabiting the houses. The islanders
applauded. But then small lizards that also lived in
the houses died after gorging themselves on dead
insects. The cats began dying after feeding on the
dead lizards. Without cats, rats flourished and began
overrunning the villages. Now people were
threatened by sylvatic plague carried by fleas on the
rats. Fortunately, this situation was brought under
control when WHO had the Royal Air Force
parachute cats into Borneo.
On top of everything else, the thatched roofs
of some houses began to fall in. The dieldrin also
killed wasps and other insects that fed on a type of
caterpillar that either avoided or was not affected by
the insecticide. With most of their predators
eliminated, the caterpillar population exploded. The
larvae munched their way through one of their
favorite foods, the leaves that made up the roofs.26
The first Biosphere 2 mission is also indicative of the dangers
of the erosion of biodiversity. Eight people intended to live in a 3.15
acre closed ecosystem for two years. The Biosphere included
agricultural land, wetlands, rain forest, desert, savanna, and even a
mini-ocean with coral reefs. A limited sample of biodiversity was
thought adequate to keep the system functioning and to supply the
human inhabitants with all their needs. It was not. The experiment
ended early, and in failure. Atmospheric oxygen concentration
dropped to 14% (a level typical of elevations of 17,500 feet); carbon
dioxide spiked erratically; nitrous-oxide concentrations rose to levels
that can impair brain function; nineteen of twenty-five vertebrate
species went extinct; all pollinators went extinct, thereby dooming to
eventual extinction most of the plant species; aggressive vines and
algal mats overgrew other vegetation and polluted the water; crazy
26 ROHLF, supra note 9, at 15-16.
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ants, cockroaches, and katydids ran rampant.27
Most environmental scientists and conservationists would
agree that if our goal is to protect biodiversity, the test will be the
richness of this country's flora and fauna in 100 years, not the number
of species that have been saved from the threshold of extinction. Our
focus, therefore, should be on saving functioning ecosystems.28
Conservationists are increasingly recognizing the importance of
addressing efforts toward saving habitats rather than individual
29species.
The listing of a species under the ESA depends upon its rarity.
This approach is not necessarily conducive to biodiversity - it is not
even closely connected. Although rarity may be a good predictor of
vulnerability, it is a poor indicator of the species' ecological role or
importance. Some species play pivotal roles in their ecosystem and
the reduction of their numbers, even if not great enough to come
under the definition of "endangered", may be much more significant
in an ecosystem's decline than the loss of a species which was always
rare. 0 Of course, public nuisance would not directly address this
concern. The success of a public nuisance action will depend on the
value of the species to human society. However, the public nuisance
approach may catch keystone species before they are endangered
under the ESA. The protection of a keystone species may in turn
save a habitat which sustains several other species which are not
charismatic, economically useful, or protected under law.
The rarity approach of the ESA results in a siege mentality in
which human society is perceived to be closing in on rare species and
their habitats. This perception may be accurate to some degree and
27 See Paul R. Ehrlich et al., No Middle Way on the Environment, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1997, at 98, 101.
28 See Scott, supra note 12, at 284.
29 The conservation of entire habitats would protect the higher levels of
biological organization. The large public land holdings would probably provide
the only opportunity to maintain protected ecosystems on a large scale. See
Noss, supra note 11, at 237-38.
30 See id. at 236.
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in some cases. However, this somewhat mistaken belief leads to the
idea that species must be protected through segregation -- by setting
aside parks, wilderness areas, and nature reserves. However, if we
want to maintain a beautiful and functioning natural environment
throughout the nation, and not just in a few remote wilderness
reserves, then regulating private land use is necessary to protect
biodiversity. A sensible land use regulation strategy to protect
biodiversity must balance between environmental and other social
and economic goals.3' The law of public nuisance is well suited to
such a balancing approach.
III. Public Nuisance Law
Nuisance is the common law backbone of modem
environmental law.32 Nuisance law has no apparent limitations in its
application. It has been used to address air, water, and soil pollution.
Its reach also extends to such blights upon the social landscape as
crack houses and adult bookstores. Public nuisance law should cover
the problem of private landowners unreasonably encroaching upon
wildlife and its habitat.33
The law of nuisance is divided into two applications -- public
and private. A private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of land.34 A public nuisance
differs in that the substantial and unreasonable interference must
affect a right common to the general public as opposed to a specific
31 See Hal Salwasser, In Search of an Ecosystem Approach to
Endangered Species Conservation, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION
247,249-250 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed., 1991).
32 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.1, at 2
(1986).
33 A corollary to this proposition is that government action to protect
wildlife will not be subject to a takings claim. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, at 1027-1032 (1992); on remand,, 309 S.C.
424, 424 S.E.2d 484, (1992).
34 See RODGERS, supra note 32, § 2.2, at 33.
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landowner or landowners." Although historically there was a great
disparity between the two, the modem laws are similar in their
application. The only practical differences are that a public official
may act to restrain a public nuisance and that the doctrines of
estoppel, laches, and prescriptive rights are not recognized as
defenses to a public nuisance action. Although the wrongs are
disparate, the ultimate question is the same in both cases -- is the
harm an unreasonable and substantial interference with protected
rights?
3 6
A. Wildlife as a Public Right
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with "a
right common to the general public."" This amorphous definition
seems to encompass a claim to protect a valued natural resource,
including wildlife. A healthy and viable population of native wildlife
is arguably a public right. The following cases demonstrate that this
right has already been recognized in many jurisdictions.
As early as 1897 the Supreme Court of California recognized
the public's rights in wild game. In People v. The Truckee Lumber
Co., the Court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint of public
35 See id.; THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977) states:
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public. Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an
interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(A) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort, or the public convenience, or whether the
conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative
regulation, or
(B) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect and, as the actor knows or
has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public
right.
36 See RODGERS, supra note 32, § 2.2 at 34.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1)
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nuisance and affirmed an order refusing to vacate an injunction
against the defendant.3" The defendant, a corporation operating a
sawmill and box factory, had been discharging its refuse into the
Truckee River, thereby killing the fish in the stream. The Court held
that the complaint stated a cause of action. Under California law any
obstruction to the free use of property which affected a considerable
number of persons was deemed to be a public nuisance.39
The fish within our waters constitute the most
important constituent of that species of property
commonly designated as wild game, the general
right and ownership of which is in the people of the
state . . . . [T]he complaint shows that, by [the]
repeated and continuing acts of defendant, this public
property right is being, and will continue to be greatly
interfered with and impaired; and that such acts
constitute a nuisance, both under our statute and at
common law, is not open to serious question.40
Recent decisions demonstrate that courts are still amenable to
the contention that the public has a right to a healthy population of
wildlife. In Colorado Division of Wildlife v. Cox, the plaintiff sued
defendants, the operators of an exotic wildlife ranch, for neglecting
to contain their herd under a Colorado statute which declared loose
or illegally possessed exotic animals to be a public nuisance if they
were detrimental to native wildlife. The Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the determination that the animals were detrimental to native
wildlife and hence a public nuisance.4 This decision implicitly
recognizes that the public has a right to the continued existence and
38 See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897).
39 See id. at 399.
40 Id. at 399-400.; See also California Trout, Inc. v. State Water
Resources Control Board, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (3d Dist. 1989).
41 See Colorado Division of Wildlife v. Cox, 843 P.2d 662 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992).
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well-being of native wildlife.
In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp, the plaintiffs were persons
who were engaged in a variety of businesses and professions relating
to the harvesting and sale of marine life from the Chesapeake Bay.
The defendant allegedly polluted the Bay with the chemical Kepone.
The plaintiffs sued for lost profits resulting from the loss of marine
life due to the pollution.42 The Court allowed this suit, but did not
explicitly state that the public had a right in the marine life. Instead,
the court reasoned, "the fact that no one individual claims property
rights to the Bay's wildlife could arguably preclude liability. The
Court doubts, however, whether such a result would be just. Nor
would a denial of liability serve social utility: many citizens, both
directly and indirectly, derive benefit from the Bay and its marine
life. Destruction of the Bay's wildlife should not be a costless
activity."43 This is essentially the rationale for the recognition of the
public rights in natural resources.
The economic significance of wildlife is an important factor
in a court's willingness to determine that wildlife is a protected right.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, indicates that demonstrating a public right based on historic,
esthetic, or moral values is more difficult. The Commonwealth sued
to enjoin the construction of an observation tower by the Defendant,
alleging that the proposed construction was "a despoliation of the
natural and historic environment."' The Commonwealth claimed it
had authority to bring the suit under Article 1, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which provided, "[T]he people have a
42 See Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
The defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint, which alleged negligence
and nuisance, among other things.
43 Id. at 978. The Court adopted the same reasoning for dismissing the
motion as to the nuisance claim as they had to the negligence claim. Id. at 982.
44 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 589-590, (Pa. 1973), (quoting Dr. Milton E. Flower,
Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College; Member, Board of Directors,
Cumberland County Historical Society). Id. at 590, n.2.
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right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of
all the people, including the generations yet to come.
41
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that this provision
was not self-executing. 46 The Court reasoned that although the
Commonwealth did have the police power to regulate land use in
order to establish clear air and water standards, historical and
aesthetic considerations had not traditionally been considered
sufficient to constitute a basis for the Commonwealth's exercise of its
police power. The state constitution, ratified two years earlier in
1971, was the first effort to give the Commonwealth power in these
areas.47 Since the "natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values" had
not previously been a concern of the government, the court believed
that if the provision was self-executing, then individuals would be
singled out for conduct previously lawful with no advance warning
of the consequences under the power of the state.48 Since the law in
this area was so new, the result of a self-executing amendment would
be that no property owner would know if and when a use of his
property would be lawful.49
However, an increasing concern for the environment is
manifested in the growing trend of recognition of aesthetic, scenic,
and natural values as protected rights. In State ex rel Dresser
Industries, Inc. v. Ruddy, the state brought a public nuisance suit to
recover damages from an incident which resulted in a release of
wastes from a barite mine which was injurious to "the waterways of
45 Id. at 591.
46 See id. at 594-95; The Court held that these rights would not vest in the
people absent further legislation.
47 See id. at 592.
48 See id. at 593.
49 See id. at 593. In a later case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated that the constitutional provision definitely created a public trust of public
natural resources which was to be conserved and maintained by the
Commonwealth. Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976).
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Missouri and their environs, to the fish and wildlife in and around
those streams, and to the aesthetic, recreational, and economic values
thereof.""0 The Missouri Supreme Court noted the growing tendency
to "treat significant interferences with recognized aesthetic values or
established principles of conservation of natural resources as
amounting to a public nuisance."'" The Court ruled that the public
nuisance claim of the State was viable.
In conclusion, the public has a protected right in marine and
animal life. The extent of this right was originally dependent upon
economic and social concerns. Today courts seem increasingly
willing to recognize the aesthetic and moral value of conserving
natural resources. Thus, the concept of "public rights" is expanding
as concern for the environment grows.
B. Unreasonable Interference
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers some guidance in
determining whether an interference is unreasonable:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety,
the public peace, the public comfort, or the public
convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by
statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing
nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know,
has a significant effect upon the public right.5"
50 State ex rel Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 791
(Mo. 1980).
51 Id. at 793 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 B, cmt. e at 91
(1977)).
52 REST. (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B at (2)(a-c).
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The destruction of wildlife or its habitat would probably fit best under
subsection (c). If the conduct is egregious enough, then natural
resources will be altered irreparably, which will have a significant
effect on the public right.
In determining whether conduct constitutes a public nuisance,
the court must balance the public interest in stopping the depletion of
natural resources (which, until recently, people took for granted) and
an owner's asserted right to use her property as she wishes. At first
glance, the equities seem to weigh heavily in the landowner's favor.
She stands to suffer substantial, quantifiable, pecuniary losses if she
has to forego development of her property in order to protect a public
good which all citizens enjoy without cost.53 However, absent
regulation, a developer imposes costs on the public by destroying
natural resources. Requiring the developer to internalize these costs
through land use and environmental regulation is economically
efficient because it leads to a truer resource allocation. That is, the
developer will make a locational decision based on a cost which
includes the price of damage to the environment. A public nuisance
action should enjoin the conduct if its cost, including the cost of the
wildlife and habitat which is damaged, exceeds the benefits the new
development will provide the public.
Conduct may constitute an unreasonable interference even if
it otherwise complies with environmental regulations or if it operates
under a permit. After all, "a nuisance may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place."54 Furthermore, in addition to operating within the
law, "every business has a duty to conduct its operations in a
reasonable manner such that it does not materially interfere with the
53 The benefits to the public of wildlife may be economic, as in the Pruitt
case, or nonpecuniary.
54 Euclid v. Amber Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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general well-being, health, or property rights of neighbors or of
people generally."55
These general rules hold true for businesses operating under
environmental permits. In Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp., the defendant argued that it had not created a nuisance as a
matter of law because it had complied with all Bay Area Pollution
Control District emissions regulations.56 The Court observed the
absence of an indication in the organic statute that the District would
preempt the whole area of pollution control and noted that there was
nothing in the regulations indicating that compliance with the
regulations precluded an action for nuisance." The court declared,
"we perceive, moreover, that it is a well-settled principle of nuisance
law that the adoption of the most approved appliances and methods
of production do not justify the continuance of that which, in spite of
them, remains a nuisance."58 The Court also took into consideration
that there was nothing in the organic statute granting the District the
express authority to permit businesses to engage in activities that
were nuisances.59
The same is generally true with permits granted under federal
law. In Neal v. Darby the Court of Appeals of South Carolina ruled
that state and federal environmental permits do not excuse a
nuisance. 0 The permits are just factors to be weighed in determining
if an unreasonable interference exists. In addition, a permit may be
55 State v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 44-45 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
56 See Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971). The court held that plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to
support a cause of action but did not plead special injury and had no standing to
sue.
57 See id. at 358.
58 Id. at 359.
59 See id.
60 See Neal v. Darby, 318 S.E.2d 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
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of no evidentiary value whatsoever if the plaintiff demonstrates that
the permit was granted based on erroneous data supplied by the
defendant."
C. Application
One example of an area in which public nuisance law may be
useful is in regulating the use of pesticides on privately owned land.
Pesticides have killed gray bats in Missouri, bald eagles in Iowa,
condors in California, and brown pelicans in Puerto Rico. Pesticide
use has long term effects. A bird may accumulate enough pesticide
in its system through eating contaminated fish or insects so that
physical harm occurs or reproduction is impaired. Four-legged
animals may become sick after licking their paws clean of
pesticides.62
Section 7 of the ESA requires each federal agency to take
steps to ensure that its programs do not jeopardize an endangered
species or its habitat. This section requires the EPA to identify
pesticide uses which may harm listed species or their habitats and to
take measures to avoid adverse impacts from these uses in
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service.63 An independent
review of the EPA's pesticide program in 1986 revealed that the EPA
was not complying with the act in at least one-third of all pesticide
cases. In response to this study, the EPA developed a plan to bring
the agency into compliance by 1988. The primary thrust of the plan
was to restrict pesticide use in areas where they were harmful to one
or more endangered species. The plan was wildly unpopular with the
61 See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981).
Courts, however, are more deferential to actions taken by federal agencies
where a federal common law nuisance is alleged. See David R. Hodas, Private
Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits for Relieffrom
Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 906 (1989).
62 See Jim Serfis, Pesticide Regulation, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF
EXTINCTION 214 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed., 1991).
63 See id. at 215.
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agricultural lobby. Some USDA officials suggested to the EPA that
farmers would kill endangered species on their land to evade the
pesticide restrictions. Farmers were suddenly among the most vocal
opponents of the ESA. In response to the opposition, Congress
enacted legislation in 1987 to bar the EPA's enforcement of its plan.64
This approach to regulating pesticide is slow, costly, and politically
unpopular.
Public nuisance law could be used as a supplement to ESA's
pesticide regulation in cases where the harmful effects of a pesticide
depend upon the circumstances of its use. This would allow the
landowner to have his day in court. If he proved that the social
benefits arising from his use of the pesticide outweighed the harm
being done to the public (i.e. the destruction of wildlife or habitat)
then the landowner would not be enjoined by the court from using the
pesticide. If an unreasonable interference was demonstrated, the
remedy could be tailored to the situation. This approach avoids a
case of a sympathetic farmer suffering a substantial loss for minimal
benefits to the environment.
In conclusion, public nuisance law seems in many ways a
more inclusive and more just way to protect this nation's wildlife
than the ESA. Although the ESA serves a valid purpose, it has
enormous gaps. Public nuisance law can be used as a means of
regulating private land use by abating unreasonable interferences with
wildlife and its habitat. Because of its flexibility, it will become even
more helpful if concern for animals and the environment grows.
IV. Standing in a Public Nuisance Action
A plaintiff in a public nuisance action may seek damages or
an injunction. Whether a plaintiff has standing may depend to some
extent on the redress he is seeking. Under the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, the standing requirements for a plaintiff suing for an
injunction are more liberal than for a plaintiff seeking damages.
64 See id. at 216-19.
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C,
(1) In order to recover damages in an individual action for a
public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind
different from that suffered by other members of the public
exercising the right common to the general public that was the
subject of the interference.
(2) In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public
nuisance, one must
(a) have the right to recover damages, as indicated in Subsection
(1), or
(b) have authority as a public official or public agency to
represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or
(c) have standing to sue as a representative of the general public,
as a citizen in a citizen's action or as a member of a class in
a class action.
Therefore, a plaintiff who can establish special injury may recover in
damages or obtain an injunction, while a plaintiff without special
injury will probably only be able to maintain an action for an
injunction.
In determining whether a plaintiff has suffered a special
injury, it is important to note that the injury must be of a different
kind, and not just of a different degree. Therefore, as in the classic
case, a man does not suffer a special injury when the king's highway
is blocked just because he travels it daily and the rest of the public
uses it infrequently.65 Both have suffered only the loss of the public
right of travel. However, a difference in degree may emanate from
some actual difference in kind -- that is, the plaintiff may have some
special interest which makes it necessary for him to travel the
highway so often. Therefore, the degree of harm may actually be a
factor to be considered in deciding if there is a special injury.6 6
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1c cmt.b.
66 See id. at cmt. c.
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Pecuniary loss is normally considered a special injury.67 In
Burgess v. Tamano, the U.S. District Court of Maine held that
commercial fishermen and clam diggers suffered a special injury
from an oil spillage into a bay." The court noted a general principle
that pecuniary loss to a plaintiff will be regarded as different in kind
"where the plaintiff has an established business making a commercial
use of the public right with which the defendant interferes."
69
However, "where the pecuniary loss is common to the whole
community, or a large part of it ... it has been regarded as no
different in kind from the common misfortune, and the private action
cannot be maintained."7"
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized a special
injury to fishermen and reversed a demurrer granted to Defendants,
who had polluted the waters of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers
and destroyed fish life.71 The Court recognized that all citizens had
an equal right to fish in the waters polluted by Defendants, and that
the fish were owned, until they were taken, by the State of Oregon.
However, they found,
[t]here is a vital distinction between the rights of the
plaintiffs, who are accustomed to fishing in the river
67 See id. at cmt. h.
68 See Burgess v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973). The
court also spoke of the public right to fish and dig clams. "It would be an
incongruous result for the Court to say that a man engaged in commercial
fishing or clamming, and dependant thereon for his livelihood, who may have
had his business destroyed by the tortuous act of another, should be denied any
right to recover for his pecuniary loss on the ground that his injury is not
different in kind from that sustained by the general public. Indeed, in
substantially all of those cases in which commercial fishermen using public
waters have suffered damages for the pollution or other tortuous invasion of
those water, they have been permitted to recover." Id. at 250.
69 Id. (citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 88 at 590 (4' ed., 1971)).
70 Id. at 251 (1973) (citing PROSSER § 88 at 591).
71 See Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St.
Helens, 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939).
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
and have a license to do so, and the rights of other
citizens of the state, who never fish in the river and do
not intend to and are interested in only a general way
in the benefit the state receives by the prosecution of
a valuable industry, so that surely the plaintiffs have
a special interest differing widely from the interest of
the public in fishing in the portions of the river
mentioned.7'
The court further found that an injunction was proper because the
injury, which was the destruction of the plaintiffs' means of
subsistence, was irreparable and resulted from the wrongful acts of
Defendant. The court also stated that although there had been several
unsuccessful attempts to bring actions to prevent interferences with
fishing in Oregon before, this case was different because it was so
much greater in degree.
The underlying reason for the special injury rule is that the
courts do not want to have to decide the limit at which the degree of
harm becomes great enough to state a claim in public nuisance. The
special injury rule is easier to administer. The rule also prevents a
multiplicity of suits stemming from the same conduct. However, the
special injury requirement is superfluous to the extent it is meant to
limit frivolous or harassing claims because a plaintiff must
demonstrate a substantial injury in order to maintain a public
nuisance action. Furthermore, a court may dismiss suits or sanction
attorneys if need be.
The Court in Pruitt, supra, had an enlightened view of the
changing law of public nuisance. None of the plaintiffs claimed
property rights in the wildlife which was damaged by the pollution.
However, the court still allowed a suit for damages, using a proximate
cause test to determine standing rather than the special injury rule.
The court held that plaintiffs whose harm was real, foreseeable, and
72 ld. at 197.
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not too remote from the pollution had standing.73 The proximate
cause test is conducive to dealing with multiplicity of claimants and
prevents frivolous suits, just as the special injury rule does. It is also
inherently more just because it does not deny redress to an individual
just because his injury is shared by his fellow citizens. However,
courts have generally retained the special injury test in actions for
damages.74
Courts are beginning to recognize a trend away from the
special injury rule in actions for injunctions. In Akau v. Olohana
Corp, the plaintiffs brought a class action to enforce rights of way
along formerly public trails to a beach which crossed the defendants'
property.75 The defendants argued that such an action could only be
brought by the State. The Court noted that this proposition was based
on the general special injury rule of public nuisance.76 The Court
traced the history of the change in focus from whether an injury is
shared by the public to whether the plaintiff was actually injured.77
In other contexts which had a similar special injury rule, such as
taxpayer actions,78 actions challenging administrative decisions,79 and
claims of harm to public trust property,80 courts have been liberalizing
the standing requirements. The Supreme Court of Hawaii joined in
the trend because they felt it was unfair to deny an injured member of
the public the power to enforce his rights just because they were
shared by others. Since the class action rules were designed to avoid
a multiplicity of actions or frivolous suits, no additional safeguards
were necessary.8
73 See Pruitt, 523 F.Supp. at 980.
74 See Hodas, supra note 62, at 895.
75 See Akau v. Olohana Corp, 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982).
76 See id. at 1133.
77 See id.
78 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
79 See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
80 See Besig v. Friend, 463 F. Supp. 1053 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
81 See Akau, 652 P.2d at 1134.
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In conclusion, a plaintiff who suffers pecuniary loss which is
different than that suffered by the community at large because of an
unreasonable interference with wildlife will probably have standing
under the special injury rule. Therefore, she may seek damages or an
injunction. Plaintiffs who do not fit within the strictures of the
special injury rule may still have standing in a court which recognizes
the trend towards liberalized standing rules in public nuisance
actions. In that case, the plaintiff would probably still have to fulfill
the requirements of the state's class action standing rules.
V. The Preemption of Common Law Public Nuisance
Traditionally, the regulation of wildlife was the province of
the state governments. Today, the common law power to regulate
wildlife is tempered by federal and state environmental statutes. A
public nuisance action to protect wildlife will only be preempted by
the ESA if its object is to attack commerce in an endangered species
which has been authorized under the ESA. The law may be
preempted if the ESA in conjunction with another federal statute
comprehensively regulates the offensive conduct. Lastly, public
nuisance law may be preempted if a state statutory scheme
comprehensively regulates the protection of wildlife.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
mandates that the states may legislate in areas in which the states and
the federal government have concurrent jurisdiction only at the
sufferance of Congress."2 The question of whether a particular federal
statute preempts state law must be determined by an inquiry into
Congressional intent.83 Preemption may be express or implied. The
Supreme Court has recognized at least two types of implicit pre-
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 2; H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Brown, 519
F.Supp. 1383, 1385 (E.D. Cai.1981); aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 702 F.2d 758
(9'" Cir.Cal. 1983); cert denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
83 See Brown, 519 F. Supp. at 1385.
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emption: field preemption and conflict preemption.84  Field
preemption occurs when the scope of federal regulation is so
sweeping that it seems reasonable to infer that Congress meant to
leave no room for the States to add to it. Conflict preemption is when
it is impossible to comply with both federal and state regulations or
where state law is an obstacle to realizing the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
The language in the Endangered Species Act makes clear that
the state law of nuisance as applied to wildlife, plants, and habitat
would not be preempted, except as applies to commerce in
endangered or threatened species. The Act states that it does void any
state law or regulation which permits commerce in an endangered or
threatened species which is prohibited by the Act or which prohibits
that which is authorized by an exemption or permit provided for
under the Act.86 However, the law goes on to state:
This chapter shall not otherwise be construed to void
any State law or regulation which is intended to
conserve migratory, resident, or introduced fish or
wildlife, or to permit or prohibit sale of such fish or
wildlife. Any State law or regulation respecting the
taking of an endangered species or threatened species
may be more restrictive than the exemptions or
permits provided for in this chapter or in any
regulation which implements this chapter but not less
restrictive than the prohibitions so defined.87
Therefore, a common law nuisance action with the purpose of
conserving wildlife would not be preempted by this Act. Although
a state public nuisance action could not be used to attack a permit or
84 See Gade v. National Solid Waste Management, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
85 See id.
86 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1535(f)
87 r1
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exemption which allowed commerce in an endangered or threatened
species, it could be used if the species was not listed as endangered
or threatened under the Federal Act.8 Furthermore, a state public
nuisance action could successfully enjoin the taking of any species,
and be more restrictive than the Act.
For the most part, courts have recognized that the express
language of 1535(f) makes clear that state law actions are not
preempted by the Endangered Species Act. The Eastern District of
California decided in 1981 that 1535(f) was an
express statement of Congressional intent on the issue
of preemption, it expressly permits the states to
continue to legislate and regulate ... commerce in
non-indigenous species, subject only to the limitation
that the states cannot relax the requirements of federal
law or contravene the terms of a federal permit or
exemption. 9
The Second District Court of Appeals in Florida found similarly with
regard to the taking of an endangered species.9°
State law may also be preempted implicitly by a federal
statute. Conflict preemption seems unlikely to be a successful defense
against a public nuisance action -- it would not be impossible to
comply with the ESA and confine your activities in such a way so as
not to create a public nuisance. Neither does public nuisance law
make it more difficult to realize Congressional objectives in the ESA.
On the contrary, it can do nothing but further those goals. The stated
purposes of the ESA are: "to provide a means whereby the
88 See H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 758 (9d, Cir.,
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
89 Brown, 519 F.Supp. at 1387. See also Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v.
New York, 658 F.Supp. 1441 (S.D.1987), aff'd, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987).
90 See State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), clarified,
reh'g denied in part, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); review
denied, 506 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1987).
1998]
110 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 6
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation
of such endangered and threatened species."91
In many possible cases under the public nuisance law, the
species for whose benefit the ESA was enacted will not be affected
at all. They may be affected indirectly, if wildlife sharing the same
habitat is sought to be protected, or they may actually be the subject
of the dispute. In any case, allowing a public nuisance action to
protect wildlife can only further the conservation goals of Congiess
which were articulated in this Act.
The legislative history also makes quite clear that Congress
did not intend to preempt state law with the Endangered Species Act.
In the official House Report, the reporting Committee explained,
The question of preemption of state laws was of great
interest during the hearings, due in part to the fact that
the language in the Administration bill was
susceptible of alternative interpretations.
Accordingly, the Committee rewrote the language of
the Administration bill to make it clear that the states
would and should be free to adopt legislation or
regulations that might be more restrictive than that of
the Federal government and to enforce the legislation.
The only exception to this would be in cases where
there was a specific Federal permission for or a ban
on importation, exploitation, or interstate commerce;
in any such case the State could not override the
Federal action. In every other respect, the State
powers to regulation in a more restrictive fashion or to
include additional species remain unimpaired."
91 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)
92 H.R.REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1St Sess. 7 (1973).
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Further,
state law is not pre-empted, but is merely subject to
the Federal 'floor' of regulations under the Act. Thus
laws already passed in States such as New York,
California, and Hawaii, which list additional species
or prohibit such activities as sales within their
jurisdiction would remain unaffected.93
However, a 1991 case from the Northern District of Ohio held
that federal law completely preempted the field of interstate
commerce in endangered species. 4 The Court decided that the
provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Animal Welfare
Act read together completely occupied the field of this subject. This
case demonstrates that although the Endangered Species Act alone
will preempt state law only in a narrow set of circumstances, when
read in conjunction with another federal statute regulating wildlife the
ESA may completely preempt a field of wildlife management.
A further complication is that many states have
comprehensive water pollution control statutes which also serve to
protect aquatic animals. Such statutes may preempt state common
law as applied to the aquatic wildlife. For example, in California v.
New Penn Mines, the Attorney General of California brought a public
nuisance action to enjoin an alleged public nuisance caused by the
drainage of toxic mine wastes into Mokelumne River which was
extremely harmful to fish and which resulted in kills of salmon and
steelhead 5 The Court of Appeals of California, 3 rd District, held that
the Dickey Water Pollution Act was intended to be the exclusive
means by which agencies are to control water pollution and
93 Id. at 14.
94 See In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F.Supp.
100 (N.D. Ohio 1991)
95 See People of the State of California v. New Penn Mines, 28 Cal. Rptr.
337 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
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nuisance.96 Furthermore, the Fish and Game Department, who were
specifically charged with protecting fish, represented by the Attorney
General, did not have the power to bring a civil action to abate stream
pollution. Instead, it was required to refer the matter to the regional
water pollution board set up under the Dickey Act. Therefore, if the
Attorney General could maintain an action in the name of the people,
he could easily get around this requirement.97 The Dickey Act
established a complex "hierarchy of administrative agencies, a
carefully conceived group of artificial definitions, a deliberately
designed distribution of powers, and a set of administrative
procedures," which implied that the Legislature intended the statute
to be the exclusive means and procedure by which agencies of the
government were to control water pollution and the resulting
nuisances.98 It would be inconsistent if "any branch of the state
government -- armed only with loosely defined traditional functions
-- might bypass these elaborate arrangements through the device of
an injunction suit."99
In conclusion, the ESA only preempts the state common law
of nuisance insofar as it could be used to attack a permit or exemption
which allowed commerce in an endangered or threatened species. In
all other regards, state public nuisance law may regulate the
unreasonable interference with wildlife. State law may even be more
restrictive than the ESA. However, in certain circumstances public
nuisance law may be preempted if the offensive conduct is
comprehensively regulated by the ESA when read in conjunction with
another statute. Lastly, public nuisance law as applied to aquatic
wildlife may be preempted by comprehensive state water pollution
statutes.
96 See id. at 341.
97 See id. at 342.
98 See id. at 341
99 Id. at 341.
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V. Conclusion
Through the enactment of the ESA, Congress has expressed
a national goal of protecting wildlife from extinction. Public
nuisance law can be used to abate conduct which unreasonably
encroaches upon wildlife or its habitat. This may protect any species
of wildlife, whether it is endangered or not. Private parties may bring
an action in public nuisance if they are concerned about biodiversity
or simply about preserving the natural beauty of their communities.
States generally recognize a public right in wildlife; however, private
plaintiffs will need to either show special injury or fulfill class action
requirements in order to have standing in a public nuisance action.
State public nuisance law is not preempted by the ESA. However,
public nuisance law is preempted in any areas in which the offensive
conduct is comprehensively regulated by state or federal
environmental statutes.
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